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Goldbach Triples and Key Distribution 
Deepthi Cherlopalle and Subhash Kak 
 
Abstract. This paper investigates the use of the number of Goldbach triples, or the number of three prime partitions of an odd number, 
for use in the generation and distribution of cryptographic keys. In addition to presenting randomness properties of these triples, which 
turn out to be similar to that of prime partitions of even numbers, we explore the question of restricted partition sets. We propose a 
protocol for key distribution that is based on these numbers.  Two of the three partitions of the randomly chosen number serve as 
cover to send the third number to the two parties that wish to communicate with each other. This third number can serve as session 
key and the original number of which it is a partition can be used for audit purposes.  
Keywords. Goldbach sequences, key distribution   
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the problem of key distribution among n users. For secure communication among these users a total of n2 keys are required 
and this number increases rapidly as the number of users increases. In the problem of distributing keys in ad hoc networks, the number 
of users can become uncontrollably large. For two parties to communicate securely over such networks, they must be able to 
authenticate one another and agree on a secret encryption key. Key establishment protocols are used at the start of a communication 
session in order to verify the parties’ identities and establish a common session key. In key transport protocols, the session key is 
created by one entity and is securely transmitted to the other. In key agreement protocols, information from both entities is used to 
derive the shared key.  
For some applications efficient scalable one-pass two-party key establishment protocols are needed. In those schemes, only 
one of the parties transmits information in order to create the session key (but does not transmit the key itself). This means that one-
pass approaches lie somewhere between the key transport and key agreement categories. Almost all one-pass approaches belong to the 
category of authenticated key establishment protocols, because they provide implicit key authentication, meaning that the parties using 
the protocol are assured that no one else can possibly learn the value of their session key.  
Here, we consider the use of Goldbach triples [1] in establishing session keys in a secure protocol. Goldbach numbers as 
partitions of even numbers were recently proposed for key distribution [2],[3] and the present paper should be seen as a companion 
paper. The study of these numbers with interesting number theoretic properties is part of an ongoing research program that includes 
the use of prime reciprocals [4]-[8], Pythagorean triples [9],[10], and permutation transformations [11]-[13]. Number theoretic aspects 
of partitions are well known in mathematics [14],[15].  The larger problem of cryptography is generally considered from the 
perspective of computational complexity [16]. 
The protocol proposed here is a key agreement protocol which is a modification of the one proposed in [2]. The fact that we 
have three partitions rather than two (if the starting random number is even) provides flexibility that leads to an elegant procedure. We 
assume that the certification authority (CA) generates the triples of a randomly chosen number and uses the stored values of the hashes 
of the secret keys of the party as a cover to transport one of the random partitions of the initial number to the two parties. This is done 
by piggybacking this random number in an XOR sum with the other two triples to the two parties in a manner that the eavesdropper 
cannot obtain this number even if she had access to the data on both the links between CA and the two parties. The system does not 
use the secret numbers or keys associated with each user. The knowledge of the hash of the key suffices to authenticate a user. It is 
assumed that CA has enough controls in place to ensure that the hashes of keys are not compromised. To prevent relay attacks, nonce 
may also be used.  
 
 
II. GOLDBACH TRIPLES 
 
According to the Goldbach weak conjecture, any odd number can be represented (in one or more than one way) as a sum of three 
primes [1]. The partitioning as three primes is thus a Goldbach triple and it is this number of partitions that will be used to generate 
random numbers. Some examples: 
   9 = (3+3+3)   and (5+2+2)   
 11 = (7+2+2) and (5+3+3)   
 13 = (7+3+3) and (5+3+3) 
 15 = (11+2+2), (7+5+3), (5+5+5) 
 17 = (13+2+2), (11+3+3), (7+7+3) and (7+5+5) 
 19 = (13+3+3), (11+5+3), (7+7+5) 
            21 = (7+7+7), (11+5+5),(11+7+3),(13+5+3) and (17+2+2)  
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 23 = (19+2+2), (17+3+3), (13+5+5), (13+7+3) and (11+7+5)  
  …… 
  The number of prime partitions for small odd numbers less than 38 is given in Table 1. But as seen in Table 2, the number of 
partitions increases faster than the number as it becomes large. The number of partitions for 1927 is 3,016 while the number of 
partitions for 1929 is 2,093. 
 
       
  Table 1. 
Odd 
Number 
Prime 
Partitions 
9 2 
11 2 
13 2 
15 3 
17 4 
19 3 
21 5 
23 5 
25 5 
27 7 
29 7 
31 6 
33 9 
35 8 
37 9 
 
      III.  STRING GENERATION 
We first consider the number of prime partitions of the first 2000 odd numbers.  These numbers will be eventually used o generate a 
set of random numbers. All these numbers are represented as n on the X-axis in Fig. 1 and the Goldbach numbers for these numbers 
are noted in the corresponding g(n) column along the Y-axis. 
    
Figure 1. The number of Goldbach partitions  
  From Table 2, we note that the number of Goldbach triples increases faster than the number. Looking at Figure 1, it is most 
remarkable that there are two separate ranges of the number of partitions that become clear around n equal to 800 or so. The numbers 
in Table 2 are thus bunched around 2100 and 3100, respectively. 
  The following properties are consistent with the data in Table 2: 
 
   g(6k+3) ≤ g(6k+7) for k >10 
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   g(6k+5) ≥ g(6k+3) for k >10 
  As for partitions in two primes of even numbers, the function g(n) has local oscillations with a period of 6. Thus there are 
local minima for n = 171, 177, 183, 189, and so on, and local maxima for n = 173, 179, 185, 191, and so on. As we can see in Table 2, 
the swing between values becomes increasingly larger as the numbers increase and the values in the Table vary by more than fifty 
percent.  
  We now investigate the autocorrelation function of the g(k) sequence. The autocorrelation function captures the correlation of 
data with itself. For a data sequence X(s), is represented by 
 
))(),((),( tXsXcorrtsC =  
where, corr is the correlation and X(s) and X (t) are two random variables at points s and t. For a noise sequence, the autocorrelation 
function will be two-valued, with value of 1 for s=t and a zero value for s≠t. Assuming that we are dealing with ergodic processes, we 
can, for a discrete sequence, aj, use the following mathematical form of the autocorrelation function:                  
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where n is period and k = 0 to n-1. For computation purposes we map 0 as -1. Figure 2 is the autocorrelation graph for prime partitions 
(reduced to binary values) of odd numbers up to 1067. For this computation all odd counts were taken to be 1 and all even counts were 
taken to be -1. 
 
        
  Table 2. 
Odd 
Number 
Prime 
Partitions 
1925 2807 
1927 3016 
1929 2093 
1931 3131 
1933 3030 
1935 2008 
1937 3180 
1939 2920 
1941 2124 
1943 3209 
1945 2836 
1947 2127 
1949 3183 
1951 3033 
1953 2121 
1955 2979 
1957 3090 
1959 2132 
1961 3211 
1963 3096 
1965 2055 
1967 3159 
1969 3024 
1971 2166 
1973 3249 
1975 2866 
1977 2210 
1979 3255 
1981 3017 
1983 2225 
1985 3068 
1987 3171 
1989 2164 
1991 3286 
1993 3182 
1995 2029 
1997 3310 
1999 3105 
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Figure 2. Autocorrelation number of count of Goldbach triples 
 
  
This autocorrelation function is consistent with that of a pseudorandom sequence. 
 
IV. TRIANGLE NUMBER SUBSET OF GOLDBACH TRIPLES 
In this section we present a further property of number of partitions associated with Goldbach triples of use where we wish to consider 
a subset of Goldbach triples. Such subsets can increase the cost of the eavesdropper in certain applications. 
  One specific subset is to consider only such triples that can be valid lengths associated with a triangle. If such numbers are 
placed as increasing sequence a, b, c, then the largest number c should not be greater than the sum of the other two numbers. We call 
such numbers triangle numbers, even though this usage has a more restricted meaning in the literature. This property can also be 
called the geometrical property of “sum of two sides” (the sum of the lengths of any two sides of a triangle must be greater than the 
third side). 
 
     
Table 3. Triples satisfying 
triangularity 
9=3+3+3 
11=3+3+5 
13=3+5+5 
15=3+5+7 
15=5+5+5 
17=3+7+7 
17=5+5+7 
19=5+7+7 
21=7+7+7 
23=5+7+11 
25=3+11+11 
25=7+7+11 
27=3+11+13 
27=5+11+11 
27=7+7+13 
29=3+13+13 
29=5+11+13 
29=7+11+11 
31=5+13+13 
31=7+11+13 
33=7+13+13 
33=11+11+11 
35=5+13+17 
35=7+11+17 
35=11+11+13 
37=3+17+17 
37=7+13+17 
37=11+13+13 
39=3+17+19 
39=5+17+17 
39=7+13+19 
39=11+11+17 
39=13+13+13 
41=3+19+19 
41=5+17+19 
41=7+17+17 
41=11+11+19 
41=11+13+17 
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43=5+19+19 
43=7+17+19 
43=11+13+19 
43=13+13+17 
45=7+19+19 
45=11+17+17 
45=13+13+19 
47=5+19+23 
47=7+17+23 
47=11+13+23 
47=11+17+19 
47=13+17+17 
49=3+23+23 
49=7+19+23 
49=11+19+19 
49=13+13+23 
49=13+17+19 
 
 
   We see that these partitions also satisfy properties similar to the unrestricted partitions of odd numbers.
Table 4. Number of 
triangular partitions 
 
Odd 
Number 
Triangle 
Partitions 
971 232 
973 210 
975 158 
977 244 
979 228 
981 161 
983 251 
985 218 
987 170 
989 260 
991 220 
993 167 
995 233 
997 231 
999 176 
 
  For odd numbers from 971 to 999, the number of triangular partitions also falls into two bunches: one around 160 or so and 
the other around 240 or so.  
  Table 4 is a count of the first few numbers of prime partitions which satisfy the triangular property. The table also gives the 
corresponding binary code. 
 
                  Table 4. Triangular prime partitions and binary code 
Odd Number Prime Partitions  
Binary 
sequence 
9 1  1 
11 1  1 
13 1  1 
15 2 -1 
17 2 -1 
19 1  1 
21 1  1 
23 1  1 
25 2 -1 
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Figure 3. Autocorrelation function for the triangular subset 
 
Figure 3 is the autocorrelation graph generated for input numbers ranging from 1 to 2000 (for the triangular subset). The 
autocorrelation function in Figure 3 is quite like the function for unrestricted partitions (Figure 2). 
   
V. GOLDBACH TRIPLES PROTOCOL (GTP) 
We now present a protocol for key exchange that uses Goldbach triples.  The protocol assumes a Certification Authority (CA) that 
either issues private keys to Alice and Bob or they choose their own private keys.  In the beginning, during the period of registration, 
Alice and Bob share hashed values of their keys h(Ka) and h(Kb) with the Certification Authority. A cryptographically strong hashing 
function is used. If such a function outputs number of bits larger than the hashed number of bits for the keys, the extra bit of the 
hashed value can be ignored. 
The private keys of Alice and Bob are Ka and Kb, respectively. The protocol is set in motion when one of the parties (say, 
Alice) approaches CA for a session key for communication with Bob. CA negotiates a connection between Alice and Bob using 
Goldbach triples. The procedure requires that CA first splits a randomly chosen odd number into a sum of three primes. One of these 
primes will be the key that will be used by Alice and Bob for their secure communication. The randomly chosen number and its 
partitions are a part of the audit trail associated with the secure session. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. CA sends P1 and P2 under cover of hash functions to Alice and Bob 
Step 1: CA generates a random odd number (N) as a sum of three primes: 
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N=P1⊕P2⊕P3 
CA adds one of the three primes to the hash of the private key (Bit XOR) of Alice and sends it to Alice. Similarly another prime is 
added to the hash of the private key of Bob and sent to Bob. 
In the second part of this Step, Alice and Bob extract P1 and P2 by using their own locally generated hashes of their secret keys, Ka and 
Kb, respectively. This step could also be postponed to the very last as was done in the example that follows. 
Step 2: CA now sends P1⊕P3 to Alice and P2⊕P3 to Bob. If the eavesdropper has access to both these communications, she will be 
left with P1⊕P2 , which will not reveal any information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. CA sends P1⊕P3  to Alice and P2 ⊕ P3 to Bob 
Step 3: Both Alice and Bob are now able to extract P3, the random number that will serve as the seed to generate the session key. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The common key P3 is now used to generate secure link between Alice and Bob 
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CERTIFICATION 
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Example: Consider the random number N = 181 that has 80 prime partitions.  
Let us suppose that CA uses the following partition out of the list: 181=31+67+83. The binary representation of these partitions is as 
below: 
P1 = 31 = 0111111 
P2 = 67 = 1000011 
P3 = 83 = 1010011 
 
Let h(Ka) = 47 and h(Kb) = 99 
 
h (Ka) = 47 = 0101111 
h (Kb) = 99 = 1100011 
 
Step 1: 
Alice:P1⊕h(Ka) Bob:P2⊕h(Kb) 
 
0111111 
0101111 
0010000 Result1 
1000011 
1100011 
0100000 Result2 
 
Step 2: 
Alice:P1⊕P3 
 
Bob:P2⊕ P3 
 
0111111 
1010011 
1101100 Result3 
1000011 
1010011 
0010000 Result4 
 
Alice:P1⊕h(Ka)⊕ P1⊕ P3 
 
Bob:P2⊕KB⊕ P2⊕ P3 
 
0010000 
1101100 
1111100 Result5 
0100000 
0010000 
0110000 Result6 
 
Step-3: 
Alice: h(Ka)⊕ P1⊕h(Ka)⊕P1⊕ P3 
 
Bob: h(KB)⊕ P2⊕h(KB)⊕ P2⊕ P3 
 
0101111 
1111100 
1010011Final Key 
1100011 
0110000 
1010011Final Key 
 
  Finally, Alice and Bob will have obtained the same key (P3) and they establish a secure connection using it. The reason why 
the session key P3 is sent in the second step, rather than by adding it to the two hashes of the secret keys of Alice and Bob in the first 
step itself, is to protect the hashes of the keys in case the session key gets compromised. To this extent, this protocol is an 
improvement on the version that was presented in [3]. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigated the use of Goldbach triples for use in the generation and distribution of cryptographic keys. We presented 
randomness properties of these triples and explored the question of restricted partition sets. We proposed a protocol for key 
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distribution that is based on Goldbach triples that appears to provide greater security than another protocol based on two prime 
partitions [3].  Two of the three partitions of the randomly chosen number serve as cover to send the third number to the two parties 
that wish to communicate with each other. This third number can serve as session key and the original number of which it is a 
partition can be used for audit purposes. 
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